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Abstract 
This paper aims to critically evaluate the privatised water & sewage industry in England. We find that 
the public-owned sector in Scotland delivers the service just as efficiently, albeit at a lower cost to 
consumers. Our econometric analysis suggests that the 40% increase in real household bills since 
privatisation was mainly driven by continuously growing interest payments on debt, contrary to the 
regulator attributing them to growing costs and investments. Finally, we show that the skyrocketing 
debt levels are primarily the result of disproportionate dividend pay-outs, which exceeded the privatised 
companies’ cash balances in all but one year since 1989. We conclude that the way the industry operates 
may no longer be sustainable and seems to disadvantage consumers greatly without their knowledge, 
as there is a fog of misleading statements by the companies and the regulator. 
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Section I - Introduction 
 
The full privatisation of all 10 water & sewage companies in England in 1989 is still the subject of fierce debate, 
even today. On the one hand, it is argued that water is a public good and right, and as such should be affordable 
and accessible to all citizens, even subsidised by the government. Others claim that only the private sector 
could have efficiently managed the large amount of capital expenditure needed to modernise and sustain the 
aging infrastructure. The topic became a major discussion point during the 2017 elections, when Labour argued 
the price of water in England is excessively high compared to Scotland, where the water industry remains public 
(Labour, 2017). Nonetheless, the politicians never pointed to the root cause for this discrepancy. The UK water 
industry presents a rather unique opportunity to benchmark two different ownership types, allowing to verify 
the merits of privatisation. The purpose of this paper is to add substance to the discussion and determine why 
household bills in England are so high today.   
To see what this debate stems from, Figure 1 presents the average household water & sewage bills in England 
(weighted by households serviced per company) and Scotland (single provider - Scottish Water) benchmarked 
to the inflation rate during the same period. Values are normalised to 100% starting in 1989 (First Scottish 
Water data point in 2002 normalised to the inflation value on that date for comparative purposes - 150%). It 
turns out that prices in England are now 40% higher in real terms than they were in 1989. In Scotland, real bills 
are still the same as they were 17 years ago, while the equivalent period saw English bills increasing by over 
17%, from £337 to £395 - a significant difference. 
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Figure 1 – Average household bill in England and Scotland vs Inflation 
Ofwat, the English industry regulator often provided reasons for the large surge in household bills. Some of those 
arguments will thus serve as structure for this paper: 
• Hypothesis 1. “Thanks to private ownership, £140bn of investment has gone into the sector over the past 
thirty years with costs “kept in check” and bills “a third lower than they otherwise would have been in public 
hands” - Ofwat chief executive Cathryn Ross (2017) 
 
• Hypothesis 2. “The 4.2% annual increase in bills before inflation is needed to finance the substantial capital 
programme for further environmental and service improvements, and higher costs faced by companies.” – 
2004 Price Review (Ofwat, 2004) 
“Ofwat estimates that, since 1999, the main reasons for bill increases have been costs of complying with 
environmental and drinking water legislation and maintaining the existing network. Operational efficiencies 
have partially offset these cost drivers” – Audit of the English Water Industry (National Audit Office, 2015) 
 
The goal of this paper is to test those arguments empirically and, in the process, establish the real cause behind 
growth of real bills and the price discrepancy with Scotland. To do so, we will analyse each of those statements 
individually:  
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• Hypothesis I - Private ownership led bills to be 33% lower than under public ownership due to efficiencies – 
verified by benchmarking England to public-owned Scotland 
• Hypothesis II – It was growing investments and costs that drove average household bills to raise by over 40% 
in real terms since privatisation 
• Hypothesis III: There are reasons, other than those in H1&2 that can explain the large real price growth. 
Section II - Literature review 
 
There is a vast amount of literature relating to the UK water industry, which makes it surprising that to the best 
of my knowledge, there has not been a benchmark study comparing England and Scotland. This essay will among 
others attempt to fill this research gap.  
Efficiency 
There is considerable evidence showing that the efficiency of public ownership in the water industry is at least as 
good as that of private operators. A systematic review in 2008 of the global literature on all aspects of efficiency 
in water supply concluded that there is no direct evidence suggesting a causal relation between ownership type 
and efficiency (Gonzalez-Gomez & Garcia-Rubio, 2008). Another international review published in 2010 analysed 
27 empirical studies on comparative efficiency in water services in various countries. It was found that private 
ownership is not systematically less costly than public owned” (Bel, Fagenda, & Warner, 2010). A 2007 study on 
England’s efficiency concluded, that while technical change improved post privatization, productivity, average 
efficiency levels were actually moderately lower in 2007 than they had been at privatization” (Saal, Parker, & 
Weyman-Jones, 2007).  The above conclusions were somewhat reaffirmed by Ofwat – a 2011 report found, that 
public-owned Scottish Water’s cost efficiency was, “contrary to expectations”, on par with England and Wales 
(Ofwat, 2011). In 2010, Scottish Water’s Overall Performance Assessment (OPA), a broad measure of water 
companies’ quality and efficiency calculated by the regulator Ofwat, was also on par with its English counterparts. 
(Water Industry Commission for Scoland, 2010) 
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU)  
https://www.gre.ac.uk/business/research/centres/public-services/home 
 
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU), Business Faculty, University of Greenwich, Park 
Row, Greenwich, London SE10 9LS, UK 
 
Prices 
A comprehensive study of water prices was conducted in France, where about three - quarters of the service was 
delivered by the private sector through concessions or lease contracts. It was found that in 2004, after making 
allowance for all other factors, the price of water provided by private companies was 16.6% higher than in places 
where municipalities provided it (Chong, Huet, & Saussier, 2006). In 2009, an independent review of charging for 
household customers in England concluded that water affordability in England is a real and an intensifying issue. 
Furthermore, it suggested the government offer support to customers in most expensive areas, which led South 
West Water customers to receive a £50 subsidy to offset their bills. (Walker, 2009) 
 
An extensive report by the National Audit in England paints a positive picture of the privatised industry: “Since 
privatisation, Ofwat’s price cap regulation has promoted substantial service and efficiency gains to the benefit of 
consumers, while maintaining a stable and attractive climate for investors”. The auditors seemed satisfied with 
the regulatory framework of the industry, never questioning prices being too high. The audit also did not point 
out any problems with the growing debt levels of all companies. It did, however, put some question mark over 
the 5-year price setting system - according to the report,  during 2010-15 the companies benefited from several 
factors outside their control (lower than Ofwat’s assumed tax rate, higher inflation, lower cost of debt) to gain 
over £1.2bn in excess profits, whilst (as stated by Ofwat and not verified by the audit) passing on only 400m to 
customers through “incurring additional costs”, without a single price decrease (National Audit Office, 2015).   
 
Contrary to this positive outlook, PSIRU (a public services research unit within the University of Greenwich) has 
expressed – in numerous papers – their criticism of the water industry, calling it dysfunctional and unsustainable. 
In one paper, they argue that privatisation costs consumers £2.3bn more per year due to dividend spending and 
high interest costs. They also highlight potential problems resulting from extremely high levels of debt. (Bayliss & 
Hall, 2017). The issue of dividends is also brought up in a paper by Armitage, who argues that the high pay-outs 
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by the water industry in England cannot be explained by any mainstream dividend theories (tax, debt, agency 
costs etc.), and are the result of strong demand for dividends from investors. (Armitage, 2012).  
 
While the brief literature casts a shadow of a doubt on our first two hypotheses, it is important to investigate the 
subject using actual financial data, which we will present in the following sections.  
Section III - Data 
 
Data collection began with finding all the average household water & sewage bills over the 27-year period for 
each company. The task required visiting tens of various online materials (annual reports, OFWAT and other 
institutional publications), but also reaching into the National Archives to find documents related to the early 
years after privatisation. To formulate the average price for England and Wales, each company’s average 
household bill was weighted with the number of households it served to receive a better overall picture. 
To determine drivers to price increases, I have manually compiled individual financial results from all 11 
Companies under analysis, including their Revenues, Capital Expenditures (CAPEX), Operating Expenditures 
(OPEX) and Interest Payments over the years. I have also compiled data on individual companies’ capital 
structures (yearly net debt levels) and dividend pay-outs. These were found again using annual reports, Ofwat 
publications and by visiting the National Archives. As a result, a full set of data points since 1989 was obtained 
for England and Wales, however, data for Scotland only starts from 2001/02. In that year, Scottish Water was 
established from a merger of previous 3 Water Companies established in 1996 (through a merger of previous 9 
companies) (Scottish Water, 2018). As such, financial data wouldn’t have been remotely comparable before 
2001 due to potential synergies achieved after those organisational mergers (As stated in the response to my 
Freedom of Information Request). All financial and pricing data was next converted to 2016 prices using the 
official RPI record from the Office of National Statistics to eliminate inflation biases in our model, allowing us to 
analyse drivers behind real price increase (Office for National Statistics, 2018). 
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Given the differences in populations served by the different water authorities, I decided to normalise all data 
points on a per-household basis, and therefore obtained the number of households per UK region from 1996-
2017 (Office for National Statistics, 2017). I then used this data to extrapolate years 1989-1996 using individual 
population CAGRs of each region. The final challenge came with assigning those households to each individual 
company. Some regions are served by only one water company, while others are split between different 
companies (Appendix III). To assign the populations accurately, I examined annual reports of individual 
companies and compared the number of customers (households) reported in different years. I then used these 
numbers to extrapolate the % share of each company in each region to get a rather accurate approximation 
(verified by comparing obtained weighted average household bills with those reported by Ofwat in different 
years). 
Section IV - Hypothesis I: Public vs Private Ownership 
 
The CEO of Ofwat suggested that water prices under private ownership are 33% lower than they would have been 
in public hands. To verify this hypothesis, we proceed to compare the industries in Scotland and England. 
However, as already mentioned, prices in public owned Scotland are actually turn out to be over 10% lower.  To 
determine the most likely cause for this discrepancy, it is worth analysing general financial trends exhibited by 
each industry. 
 
As seen in Figure 2, real OPEX in England has been fairly constant throughout the period, with today’s costs 
equalling those at privatisation. CAPEX fluctuated greatly, yet largely remained in line over the whole period, 
perhaps even exhibiting a slightly downward trend – last 10 years so investments fall by 10% compared with 
both the two earlier decades. Total investments until 2018 amount to 135bn. Dividend payments (column 
values) have consistently been high, averaging at approximately £200m per year per company (£2bn aggregate), 
leading to a staggering amount of £57bn being distributed to shareholders over the 28-year period (in real 
terms and excluding special dividends until 2003). Perhaps the most striking feature of the industry is the 
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skyrocketing debt level (RHS of the graph). When the 10 water companies were floated on the stock exchange 
in 1989, the government wrote off all their debts (£4.9bn) and injected a further green-dowry (£1.5bn) to meet 
the investment requirements stemming from EU regulations (Bayliss & Hall, 2017). Since then, the 10 
companies took out an average of almost £2bn per year in debt aggregate, leading to a £51bn industry debt 
balance in 2018. As a result, annual interest payments of the industry jumped from 0 in 1990 to around £2bn 
today (corresponds to £80 per household).  
 
Figure 2 – England & Wales industry aggregate financial data since privatisation (millions) 
When it comes to Scotland, the equivalent graph looks different. OPEX declined significantly in the early years 
after the merger into Scottish Water, falling by approximately 40%. CAPEX rose substantially, declining slightly 
after 2010. The debt level today is actually lower than 16 years ago and it’s interesting to note its correlation with 
investments – after initially rising (likely to pay for CAPEX – more later), it then declined substantially with the fall 
in investments, rising again in 2015 after the announcement of a large investment programme (Scottish Water, 
2015). Accordingly, interest payments have largely remained constant. Finally, another striking difference is the 
complete lack of dividends - all profits are reinvested back into the company (Water Industry Comission for 
Scotland , 2010). 
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Figure 3 – Scotland financial data since inception (millions) 
However, to understand the 10% price discrepancy between Scotland and England, we need to compare these 
numbers on a more granular level. In this paper, we analyse the following potential explanations: 
a) Supply side - Companies in England have higher operating costs due to different market structures 
As shown in Figure 4, OPEX on a per-household basis seem to be level in Scotland and England after Scottish 
Water initiated an efficiency programme in 2002. The downward trend was expected, given rather constant 
values of OPEX over the analysed period, combined with growing population of the UK. This result seems 
consistent with Ofwat’s analysis in literature review (Ofwat, 2011), and as such, the difference in prices seem 
difficult to explain with differences in cost structures. If anything, base OPEX could in theory be higher for 
Scottish Water, as it serves the most dispersed geographical area, requiring it to manage longer pipelines in less 
populated areas (H2O Building Services, 2017). This is the likely reason behind Scottish Water having larger 
leakages - 495 Megaliters per day (Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 2017) vs. approx. 345 in England 
(Ofwat, 2017), which is  a major cost component for both industries.  
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Figure 4 – Operating Expenditures on a per-household basis (£) 
b) Demand side - consumers in England use more water per capita than in Scotland 
Even though OPEX per household is roughly same, perhaps the proposed English efficiency can be found in the 
levels of water usage - if customers in England used more water per capita, equal costs would imply better 
efficiency. The average daily water consumption in Scotland is estimated to be 150 litres per person (Scottish 
Government, 2017), while the average for the UK stands at the same level (Department of Environment, Food & 
Rural Affairs, 2013). Thus, this reaffirms our conclusion and literature that the two industries seem equal in 
terms of cost efficiency, and neither supply nor demand factors point to any significant cost differences. 
b) Companies in England invest more in the infrastructure on a per capita basis   
 
Figure 5 – Capital expenditures on a per-household basis (£) 
 
To verify whether higher prices in England are the result of higher investments, Figure 5 presents the annual per-
capita capital expenditures. The actual result may seem surprising – it is Scottish Water that invests more on a 
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per capita basis, a trend that has continued ever since Scottish Water was founded, and the difference is far from 
subtle. Looking at regulatory capital investments, Scottish Water invested nearly 35% more per household since 
2002 (average 273 per household per year vs England’s 203 per year). Had the 10 English companies invested at 
that rate, £26bn more would have gone into the infrastructure. This information suggests that it is English water 
that should in theory be cheaper, and high capital investments that Ofwat praises (National Audit Office, 2015) 
not only do not seem to explain the difference in prices, but also present us with another interesting question to 
answer – where does the extra £26bn go? (Section VI) 
  
c) Scottish Water receives subsidies from the Government to offset bill costs 
As stated by the Water Commission for Scotland (Audit Scotland, 2017) , Scottish Water’s only financing streams 
have been customer charges and government loans, which they pay interest on and must repay in full. The 
company receives no grants nor subsidies. Interestingly, it is the water industry in England that receives certain 
subsides – for instance, South West Water customers each receive a £50 subsidy to offset their bills, which are 
highest in the UK (National Audit Office, 2015). It is also this subsidised price that was used in Figure 1, which 
made the average English bill seem marginally lower than it really is. 
d) Scottish Water pays much lower interest due to receiving cheaper government loans 
As shown in Figure 6, interest payments per household in Scotland are indeed lower. However, this is most likely 
because Scottish Water has lower values of debt than the average English company – £3bn vs. £5bn in England. 
To see if it is in fact debt levels driving those differences, it is worth comparing the real interest rates paid by the 
companies on their debt.  
 
  Figure 6 – Interest payments per household 
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As could be seen in Figure A1 (Appendix IV), interest rates are slightly higher for Scottish Water, marking yet 
another unexpected discovery. The Scottish government charges Scottish Water relatively high rates, while the 
English companies have a strong preference to take on long-term debt with maturities lasting up to 2060, thus 
helping secure historically low interest rates (National Audit Office, 2015). Given the monopolistic character of 
the industry with steady and risk-less cash flows, the private companies manage to secure even better financing 
terms, and thus interest payments are higher due to larger debt stockpiles.   
Summary 
The above analysis presented evidence to reject the first hypothesis. Similarly to the literature reviewed in Section 
II, data gathered shows that public ownership seems to have resulted not only in equal (or even lower) costs, but 
also led to higher investments while keeping costs to consumer below those charged by privatised companies – 
a ‘win, win, win’. Additionally, it is worth noting that even without benchmarking to Scotland, it would prove 
difficult to find a 33% decrease in costs in England since privatisation. The only apparent differentiating factor 
between the industries is the interest paid on debt, and therefore this issue will be investigated further in the 
following section. To verify whether interest payments could in fact be the differentiating factor, the drivers 
behind price variations in both countries will be examined empirically.  
Section V: Hypothesis II - Empirical strategy 
 
Although Ofwat attributes the real increases in customer bills to “growing investments and costs,” this paper has 
already shown that the general financial trends do not reflect any such significant increases. However, to verify 
this hypothesis empirically, a simple model has to be established to determine drivers behind price changes in 
both industries. To do so, a balanced panel data set of all the individual companies’ average household bills will 
be regressed on capital expenditures, operating expenditures and interest payments from 1989 to 2017 (2001-
2017 for Scotland). Given that we only consider household prices, we need to assume that the individual 
companies’ split between household and retail customers remained approximately constant throughout the 
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period (simplification). As a result, the annual proportion of CAPEX, OPEX and interest costs attributable to 
household customers is a constant % of total costs each year, and therefore proportional changes in our variables 
will have a proportional impact on household prices.  We are then able to run a fixed effects panel data regression, 
controlling for unobserved company level heterogeneity and clustering standard errors by company: 
 
(1) 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
Such a simple model should determine which financial components had the biggest impact on prices over the last 
27 years, and perhaps give further clues as to why bills in England are so much higher.  This specification should 
serve as a good approximation, especially to test Ofwat’s hypotheses. That being said, pricing is not determined 
as a direct mark-up on costs, but rather depends on a more complicated formula, equalling the allowed rate of 
return with the weighted average cost of capital. However, that rate of return has historically been fairly constant, 
and depends directly on our parameters, which together cover almost all annual expenses. This specification also 
stems from Ofwat’s analysis of individual components of average household bills (see Appendix IV Figure A2), 
which comprise exactly our three parameters and a fairly constant profit component. As a result, our model aims 
to analyse this exact bill decomposition empirically.  
 
There are certainly other considerations worth investigating, such as breaking down those costs into further 
component parts (labour, sourcing costs etc.). Unfortunately, obtaining such specific data points for a long period 
requires a much more elaborate analysis than the scope of this paper. Moreover, the model depends on the 
accuracy and consistency of reporting – there could be potential measurement errors if certain reporting policies 
changed (not to my knowledge) or reporting was not done diligently. Additionally, one could argue there are 
endogeneity issues as higher prices could imply higher expenditures. This is unlikely to have a major impact, as 
prices get decided 5 years ahead based on expense forecasts in every price review. The long 5-year period 
between Ofwat price reviews does present another problem we need to control for in the case of England. Our 
price data shifts with every price review, as Ofwat often corrects previous mistakes. As an example, the 1999 
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price review saw an average 12% immediate reduction in prices to correct excessive returns. To control for these 
persistent shocks shifting our price data, we introduce dummy variables “Revt” corresponding to each 5-year 
price review interval (1st: 1995-1999; 2nd: 2000-04; 3rd: 2005-09; 4th: 2010-14). No such shocks occurred in 
Scotland. For the purpose of establishing directional relationships and correlation between prices and expenses, 
our model should prove be sufficient. 
 
Following the conclusions obtained in Section IV, we will also attempt to determine the driving factors behind 
debt-taking for both countries. We will again use a panel data set, this time using debt taken by each company in 
a given year as our dependent variable, controlling for CAPEX, OPEX, Interest and Dividends (in England), to see 
whether the growing debt levels and interest payments are the result of ‘higher costs and investments’: 
 
(2) 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡)
= 𝑎𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡) +   𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡) +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
 
Here too the model should explain debt-taking well, as these parameters comprise the main financing activities. 
There could certainly be omitted variables as debt also depends on tax considerations as well as M&A activities. 
Yet for the purposes of this paper, these would have been difficult to parametrise. Thankfully, these expenditures 
would have still been marginal compared to the ones considered. However, to further verify the results of this 
regression, the analysis will be supplemented with a more in-depth look into the factors driving debt-taking in 
Section V. For the purposes of establishing correlation, the model should do well.  
Section V: Hypothesis II - Results 
 
Price regression 
The results of Regression 1 for Scotland are presented in Table 1. As one can observe, all coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level, and the simple model seems to explain the variation in average water bills well. The R2 
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stands at 82%, and all the estimators except OPEX have a positive coefficient as we would have expected. The 
negative coefficient for OPEX is likely the result of operating expenditures falling by 40% in the early years. During 
that time capital investments increased even further likely driving prices higher, making the OPEX relationship 
seem negative. Confirming the early conclusions from Section III, there is a significant, positive relationship 
between interest payable and the average bills. Overall, Scotland’s regression provides evidence that the simply 
constructed model should explain the variation in prices well. However, one has to be careful interpreting 
coefficients directly, as unfortunately the sample size is fairly small, therefore increasing the potential of errors. 
 
Table 1 – Price regression for Scotland 
The equivalent regression for the aggregate industry in England can be found in Table 2. Coefficients on CAPEX 
and OPEX aren’t significant even at the 10% level and interest payments seem to be the only parameter 
explaining variation in real prices. This is also largely in line with expectations, as operating and capital 
expenditures oscillated at a fairly constant level throughout the period, therefore were unlikely to have caused 
bills to increase in the long run. The coefficients on dummy variables corresponding to price reviews are also in 
line with expectations, as the only review to reduce prices dramatically was the one corresponding to the 
negative coefficient of Rev1 (1999).  For the purposes of this paper, we are not looking to quantify what exact 
impact each parameter had, but rather analyse what has driven prices to behave as they have over the analysed 
period.  
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Initial evidence points at rejecting the second hypothesis presented by Ofwat as the significant price increases 
do not seem to have been caused by increases in operational and investment costs. These results seem to fit in 
very well with Ofwat’s decomposition of average household bills seen in Figure A2 (Appendix II), as there too 
growth in prices seems to come mostly from interest expenses. As supplement to the analysis, I also decided to 
run this specification on a per company basis as we did for Scotland, to see whether the panel results could be 
biased by just a few companies. The resulting 10 individual regressions showed similar results, with CAPEX 
significant in 3 cases, OPEX in 2, and Interest payments significant in all but one. 
However, this does create another possible explanation - perhaps the “growing investments and costs” we seek 
were so high to start with, that sustaining them at these high levels required constant debt financing, which led 
to growth in debt and interest, putting upward pressure on prices. To verify this claim, a closer examination of 
debt taking is needed to show whether borrowings were the result of consistently high costs (see Section V).  
 
Table 2 – Price regression for England 
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Debt regression 
Our next task is to then try to understand what drives the companies to take on debt, and what it is used to 
finance. The results of Regression 2 for Scotland can be found in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 – Debt regression for Scotland  
Here too, the simple model seems to explain the variation in debt taken well. The coefficient on CAPEX is 
significant, which was to be expected from the analysis of Scotland’s trends, where CAPEX and net debt seemed 
to be moving in the same direction. There also seems to be a significant correlation between interest payments, 
however, OPEX is only significant at the 5% level. The negative relationship with interest may seem odd at first. 
Perhaps as interest payments increase, the costs of debt become higher, which for a cost-averse company could 
be a good turning point to decrease debt taking to stop the upward pressure on costs.  Looking at coefficient 
values, they also make logical sense, even though one has to be careful with direct interpretation of small sample 
sizes. A 1m increase in CAPEX was on average associated with a 0.57m increase in Debt, which is very reasonable 
considering that a large portion of that expense was financed internally, requiring only a part of it to be financed 
with debt. It also fits very well with the results presented in Figure 11 (Section VI)  
 
The results of an equivalent regression for England, with the addition of dividends as potential drivers to debt, 
can be found in Table 4. Similarly, the dependent variables are all significant and appear to influence the amount 
of debt companies take. Interestingly, there seems to be an exceptionally strong relationship between debt and 
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dividends. This would in turn oppose the frequent statements made by Ofwat that pointed at high capital 
expenditures as the key reason for increasing debt levels (Ofwat, 2004).  
 
Table 4 – Debt regression for England  
The financial cost parameters seem to explain the variation in debt levels in Scotland well, however, in England, 
the situation is not as explicit as a potential alternative explanation was uncovered - dividends. In the view of the 
above findings, before rejecting the second hypothesis, the relationship between debt, investments and 
dividends needs to be explored in more detail, as the proposed growing costs could still hide within interest 
payments. 
Section VI: Alternative explanation 
 
Data 
Having witnessed strong correlation between prices and interest payments, the exact drivers to debt taking have 
to be investigated in each of the industries to see whether debt was taken to the benefit of consumers. To do 
this, we will analyse individual cash flow data for all 11 companies from 1990 to 2016 (2003-2016 for Scotland) in 
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2016 prices, following closely the approach used by S. Armitage (Armitage, 2012). The description of each 
parameter is presented in Table 5 below. All values are presented in real terms (adjusted for inflation). 
 
Operating Cash Flow Cash flow gross of capex, tax, interest, dividends 
Capital Expenditure Investments in infrastructure and maintenance 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
before interest 
Operating Cash Flow net of capex, taxes, plus proceeds from sale of financial 
assets and investment income 
FCF after interest FCF before interest net of interest payments 
Dividends Total dividends paid out (deflated - excludes special dividends until 2006) 
Cash missing FCF after interest net of dividends 
Debt taken Debt taken per company per year = (Debtt+1 - Debtt) x Inflation Correction 
Table 5 – Description of parameters 
Results 
Table 7 here from Appendix I 
The results of the aggregated, industry-level analysis can be found in Table 7 (Appendix I). In England, Operating 
Cash Flows increased consistently since privatisation from £3.8bn to £6.3bn. Throughout the reviewed period, 
Capital Expenditures remained very high in relation to operating cash flows, yet exhibit a downward trend 
especially in the last few years (investments in the last decade are 10% lower than the two previous decades). As 
a result, FCF (Before Interest) increased considerably since 1990, averaging at around £1.2bn per year. However, 
this growth has been accompanied by even faster growth of interest payments, leading the water companies to 
have, astonishingly, almost zero Free Cash Flow (after interest) left at the end of the year on average during the 
analysed period. Yet despite this cash depletion, the industry proceeded to pay out nearly £2bn in dividends per 
year, which directly implies that to finance them, the companies had to borrow around £1.9bn per year in Debt. 
In theory (ceteris paribus), the industry could have afforded to pay an average of £1.2bn in dividends per year 
without taking on any debt at all (Free Cash Flow before interest), but instead chose to pay more than balances 
allowed, driving the need to take on debt. As a result, total dividends paid since privatisation till 2017 amounted 
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to around £53bn, which led to an aggregate £49.3bn shortfall in cash. Today, the industry’s debt level stands at 
around £51bn and the similarity of those numbers doesn’t look to be coincidental.  
 
An equivalent analysis of the Scottish industry again paints a very different picture. Operating Cash Flows seem 
to have moved with prices – rising initially, only to start falling in 2009, likely due to real-term decreases in prices 
since that year - today, they are lower than they were 16 years ago. Interestingly, reaffirming our previous 
findings, Capital Expenditures form the vast majority of Operating Cash Flows, exceeding the relative investment 
levels in England. As a result, FCF (Before Interest) averaged around £130m per year and FCF (After Interest) had 
an average negative balance of 60m. This negative cash balance thus seems to have been the result of extremely 
high capital investments, as the company never paid out dividends. 
 
To verify whether the uncovered gap in cash has been the driving factor behind debt taking, it is worth plotting 
the Cash-Flow Gap (FCF after interest – Dividends) against the value of debt taken each year by each individual 
company. The results in Figures 8 and 10 show that there is a nearly perfect correlation between the two 
parameters, with the exception of the years 2001-2006 in England - this discrepancy can be explained by 
additional factors driving debt taking in that period. Before 2000, the companies stood to gain little from tax 
shields due to surplus capital allowances the companies built up in the 90s, which could be carried forward to 
reduce taxable profit to nearly 0 (A more in-depth analysis of this in Armitage 2012 p14). Therefore, it is likely 
that in the early 2000s the companies finally stood to gain from interest tax shields and therefore geared up 
above their cash flow requirements for capital structure reasons. As mentioned before, there were other 
considerations, such as acquisitions, but they wouldn’t substantially change the evidence suggesting that the debt 
primarily funded the gap in cash flows as expected. 
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU)  
https://www.gre.ac.uk/business/research/centres/public-services/home 
 
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU), Business Faculty, University of Greenwich, Park 
Row, Greenwich, London SE10 9LS, UK 
 
 
Figure 8 – England aggregate cash-flow gap vs debt taken in a given year (billion) 
Dividends are one of the last decided Cash Flow items as they are approved towards the end of a financial year. 
As a result, most of the debt taken by the English companies likely directly funded their high dividend pay-outs, 
even if this reason hid behind ‘the need to finance capital expenditures’ in corporate announcements. To further 
validate this claim, Figure 9 plots the relationship between dividends and debt taken in a given year in England & 
Wales. The results are striking – there is a clear, visible correlation between the two values. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Annual aggregate dividend payments vs debt taken in England (billion) 
To make the point even clearer, selected graphs plotting dividends vs. debt taken for individual English companies 
can be found in Figures A3-9 in Appendix IV – the correlation for some companies is absolutely astonishing. As a 
result, there seems to be very strong relationship between debt and dividends. This debt burden is then carried 
forward and grows without ever stopping, as the privatised companies had a negative cash balance in all but 1 
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year in the 30 years since privatisation. The resulting growing interest payments seem to be then passed onto 
consumers, driving their bills up, which reaffirms our price regression results. Additional benefits from debt, such 
as reduced tax expenses, seem to only further benefit the parent companies. The National Audit supports this 
statement – between 2010 and 2015 the companies gained over £1.2bn profit due to extraordinary factors, whilst 
supposedly passing on only 400m to customers through “incurring additional costs” (National Audit Office, 2015). 
 
Figure 10 – Scotland cash-flow gap vs debt taken in a given year (millions) 
When it comes to Scotland, there is a near perfect correlation between debt taken and the cash flow gap, 
presenting evidence that debt taking has been the result of staggering capital investments. If true, debt has 
directly benefited consumers as it was used to finance necessary infrastructure upgrades. To verify, Figure 11 
shows that the correlation between debt and capital expenditures is nearly perfect. 
 
Figure 11 – Scotland capital expenditures vs debt taken in a given year (million) 
An equivalent graph for England in Figure 12 shows that the relationship is nowhere near as strong as in Scotland, 
thus further validating the hypothesis that the debt taking seems to have been driven by the ‘investors’ demand 
for dividends’. 
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Figure 12 – England aggregate capital expenditures vs debt taken in a given year (billions) 
 
Evidence strongly suggests that the rapidly growing debt levels of the English water companies were not the 
result of increasing or even excessively high investments and costs. In fact, the analysis shows that the problem 
lies in significant cash outflows in the form of dividends. Following this in-depth analysis of drivers to price 
variation, we conclude that Ofwat’s attribution of bill increases to rising costs and investments is not 
reflected in financial data, thus discrediting the second hypothesis. 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this paper was to investigate claims by the regulator Ofwat to establish reasons behind real price 
increases in the privatised English water industry. After extensive analysis, enough evidence was gathered to 
reject both claims made by Ofwat, who presented high costs and investments as key drivers to higher bills. The 
main takeaways can be summarised as follows: 
• Customers in England seem to be losing significantly from the industry being in private hands when bench-
marked to public-owned Scottish Water. The efficiency and quality of the English industry is on par with Scot-
land, investments are lower, yet costs to consumers are much higher  
• Econometric evidence strongly suggests that the real price increases in England can mainly be attributed to 
growing debt levels, while in Scotland bills seem to have a strong correlation with overall financial expendi-
ture 
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• There seems to be a significant discrepancy between usages of debt between the industries. In Scotland, debt 
depends on costs and capital expenditures. In England the same doesn’t hold, as the companies could have 
afforded to finance all their operations and investments without taking on any debt at all. Instead, evidence 
suggests their debt taking was driven by overly high dividends, which exceeded their cash balances in all but 
one year since privatisation. The cost of the constantly growing debt is then passed on directly to consumers 
in the form of higher bills. 
 
What can be inferred from the analysis is that without those dividends, the companies likely wouldn’t have had 
to take on this much debt. As a result, interest payments could have been much lower, leading to lower pressure 
on bills. In fact, English customers seem to lose out on all fronts as even the key argument used by proponents of 
privatisation, “massive capital investments,” looks bleak when compared with Scottish Water which invested on 
average 35% more than the 10 English companies in the last 16 years. As literature and Scotland’s example 
show, the government seems fully capable of managing the water industry “just as efficiently, but at lower cost 
to consumers” (albeit this statement requires further research).  
 
In the course of this paper, not only have we showed that Ofwat’s explanations for price increases seem 
unrepresentative of the truth, but also that the reality looks far worse – increasing bills seem to be the implication 
of large dividend pay-outs, which have been disproportionate to the industry’s financial capabilities. As a result, 
I believe English customers have been misled with a fog of statements about ‘high private sector investments’ 
and should be made aware of this other, until now, hidden issue driving bills higher. It is very easy to impress the 
public by stating a massive, £140bn investment figure, however, what’s crucially missing is context: The number 
translates bleakly into an average of slightly more than 200£ per household per year vs an average of 270£ in 
Scotland.  
 
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU)  
https://www.gre.ac.uk/business/research/centres/public-services/home 
 
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU), Business Faculty, University of Greenwich, Park 
Row, Greenwich, London SE10 9LS, UK 
 
We conclude that the way the privatized industry operated over the last 30 years may no longer be sustainable. 
The industry’s Debt/Capital ratio stands above 70%, and some companies are on the verge of receiving a junk 
investment rating. Problems of the industry are visualised by Thames Water. The company is now owned by a 
consortium of Private Equity and financial investors, having previously been in the hands of the infamous 
Macquarie Group since 2006. Shockingly, Macquarie borrowed more than £2.8bn to finance purchase, and later 
supposedly repaid £2bn of the debt through new loans raised by Thames Water through a subsidiary in Cayman 
Islands, effectively transferring the purchase costs to customers (BBC, 2017). Furthermore, in those 10 years, debt 
increased 2.3x times (from £4bn to £10bn), dividends averaged 270m per year, yet between 2011 and 2015 they 
paid no tax (Bayliss & Hall, 2017).  
 
In 2015, Thames announced a massive ‘super-sewer’ investment project. However, putting it on its balance sheet 
would have led to a junk investment rating, something the regulator does not allow as part of its (surprisingly) 
only regulatory requirements on capital structure (in my opinion a key regulation issue). The government had to 
step in with help and an exception was made to finance the project by yet another investor consortium with a 
murky, unclear structure (unreadable network of holding companies, most located in tax-havens). The entire cost 
of the project must thus come entirely from increased customer bills. This is certainly not what people want from 
monopolist providers of a public good.  
 
Figure 13 – Severn Trent debt taken vs dividend in a given year (millions) – a near perfect correlation 
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 Appendix I – Cash Flow Tables  
 
All data points in billions (2016-17 prices).  
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Appendix II – Supplementary charts 
 
 
Figure A1 – Real interest rates (rough approximation) 
 
 
 
Figure A2 – Ofwat, decomposition of bills into component parts 
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Figure A3 – Severn Trent debt taken vs dividend in a given year (millions) 
 
 
Figure A4 – Yorkshire Water debt taken vs dividend in a given year (millions) 
 
 
Figure A5 – South West Water debt taken vs dividend in a given year (millions) 
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Appendix III – Leakage figures 
 
 
Company Leakage thousand liter / 
per day 
Pipes in km Leakage per km 
(thousand liter) 
Thames 695,000 31,448.0 22.1 
United Utilities 462,650 42,838.0 10.8 
Scottish Water 495,000 48,700.0 10.2 
Yorkshire 300,000 31,578.9 9.5 
Severn Trent 443,000 47,127.7 9.4 
England Average 
  
9.3 
Northumbrian 137,000 17,125.0 8.0 
Southern 88,700 13,859.4 6.4 
Dwr Cymru 173,000 27,460.3 6.3 
South West 83,000 13,387.1 6.2 
Wessex 67,700 11,877.2 5.7 
Anglian 183,000 38,125.0 4.8 
 
 
